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This thesis develops a concept for the simulation of
command and control networks. The concept is based upon a
model of the essential functions of command and control
systems and networks of systems. The model is used as f.he
basis for discussion of network performance evaluation, and
the performance characteristics of concern form a basis for
the simulation architecture. The simulation concept is
based upon a distributed simulation capable of utilizing a
wide range of network node simulations ranging from manual
procedures to manned simulators to fully automated
emulators. The simulation is both flexible and
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Several joint programs hai/e been created in the past in
order to answer questions regarding the interactions among
the systems that comprise a command and control network.
These include programs su:h as Tactical Air Control
Systems/Tactical Air Defense Systems (TACS/TADS). Joint
Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
(JINTACCS), and Identification Friend, Foe, or Neutral
( I F FN ) . The se programs have been characterized by several
similar types of shortcomings in their examination of the
systems involved.
The first set of problems are those concerned with the
commonality of the test systems used to conduct the network
testing. A co mm on set of air control and air defense
systems are examined oy each of the above programs In
fact, the JINTACCS program assumed the mission of the
TACS/TADS program. Despite these obvious areas of
overlapping interest, each of the programs required an
entirely separate, but functionally similar, test system.
As a result of the inability to share the necessary test
capability, millions of dollars of development effort was
repeated for each program. More importantly, the
resolution of the underlying questions and operational
8

problems was delayed for several years while the test
system was developed.
A second set of problems are those concerning the
staffing of these programs. Each of these programs has
only a small staff. The full time job of this staff ;s to
plan, conduct, and analyze tests of the target systems. In
order to accomplish these functions, the staff must m^xe
decisions regarding a test scenario, eHperimental design,
and data analysis. In designing the scenario, proficiency
must be maintained in the operational doctrine and tactics
of each of the systems under test, network procedures,
limitations and distortions introduced by the simulations
used for the test, and especially, the threat that can
realistically be enpected from the opposing forces.
Personal observation would indicate that even the most
highly qualified individuals tend to lose their proficiency
in many of these areas after being assigned to one of the
programs for a period of time.
3 SCOPE
1 . Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to present *
structure for simulating networks of comm and and control
systems which alleviates the above mentioned problems
Although the approach that is presented may be applicable
to many similar problems at multiple levels of detail, it

has been developed for a specific case. The development
and this presentation here is focused on the esami nation of
networks of tactical command and control systems. Since
the emphasis is on the interactions among the systems which
comprise networks, there was no attempt to incorporate a
capability to examine the internal mechanics of individual
sy = t ems; .
2 . Level of Presentation
The presentation of the methodology will be given
it the level of a conceptual operating system task. A
specific implementation for a given suite of equipment will
not be provided. The presentation will give descriptions
of functional characteristics, rather than specific methods
£cr implementing these functions. In many cases, the
plausible or best implementation will be highly dependent
op an tiie equipment selected.
C. ORGANIZATION
Se:t ions II and III will present a model of command and
control networks. The model that is developed will be
directed toward identifying and understanding those
elements of a command and control system which influence
the characteristics of networks. In Section IV, this model
will be used as the basis for discussing the evaluation of
c omma nd and control network performance. Sections V
through VIII will develop a simulation environment based
1

upon the model of Sections II and III. The environment
will be a computer based environment, but will be developed
consistent with the idea of accommodating useful manual and
semiautomated techniques into the simulation. The
procedures and policies which must accompany the
methodology will be presented in Section IX. And finally,




I I - MODEL OF A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
A. FUNCTIONS OF A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
1 What is Command and Control
With the recent focus on Command and Control, there
would hopefully be a universally acceptable definition or
concept of what c omma nd and control is. Unfortunately,
there is not. Therefore, virtually every paper that
addresses the area of command and control must define what
the author perceives the subject to be. Rather than taking
the normal approach of listing numerous conflicting
definitions and attempting to find the common elements, let
us look at the functions per formed* by a command and control
system. In this manner, it is possible to gain a feel for
a command and control system without being unduly bound by
a rigorous definition.
2 . Determine the Environment
The first function performed by a co mm and and
control system is a determination of the state of its
environment. This may be accomplished in a number of wcys.
The system may employ a radar unit to observe air and
surface targets, or sonar to track underwater targets. It
may receive digital data from other systems. In many cases
this perception of the system's environment can be very
simple, such as an individual scanning an area with his
1 2

eyes. This last example highlights a very important
concept. Note that although the equipment that comprises
many command and control systems usually receives the most
emphasis in descriptions and analyses, a command and
control system dees not have to be made up of computers and
sophisticated sensors. It could simply be a platoon
commander with his compass, map, notebook, and radio.
3 . Formulate a Decision
Having formulated an impression of its environment,
the system must formulate a decision based upon this
impression. The decision reached could be to ignore the
environment until a change of interest occurs. The system
could decide not to act upon the information which it has
gathered, out to forward the data to another system for
possible action, or to hold it for future reference. And
thirdly, the system may decide that some action, such as
engaging a target, may be required in response to the
environment. Of course, combinations of these decisions,
such as taking action and forwarding the information are
also possible.
4 Communicate the Decision
Once a decision other than to ignore the
information has been made, it must be acted on. This
requires the system to be able to communicate with other
systems and/or to communicate with fire and maneuver units
Note that in an air defense missile battery, the missiles
1 3

themselves are part of a weapons system and would not be
part of the command and control system. However, this fire
unit is very closely linked to the output of the command
and control system's decision. Neither the co mmand and
control system, nor the fire unit would bo effective
without the other.
3 ELEMENTS OF A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
In order to accomplish the functions of determining the
environment, formulating a decision, and conucun i c a t i ng the
decision, a command and control system can be considered as
being composed of five elements: a set or sersors, a
decision algorithm, a loci! data has*, a method of
communication, and some form of feedback. These elements
are shown in Figure 1
.
1 . Sensors
The term sensors brings to mind images of radars
and sophisticated intelligence equipment. But sensors
include all methods of observing the system's environment,
from individuals to electronics In addition, it is useful
to consider radio receivers as sensors. This points out
that sensors are used to form an impression of all aspects
of the environment. Friendly forces and neutral aspects
such as weather are as important to the perception of the
environment as are the aspects associated with enemy















FIGURE 1. Elements of a
Command and Control System
are also sensor inputs to the system. Sensors may be
static in operation, or they may be dynamically controlled
by the decision algorithm. An air defense system can
typically employ both acquisition and fire control radars
The acquisition radar acts as a static sensor, reporting on
all tracks within a fined coverage. However, the fire
control radar is used to track specific targets for
engagement. The targets to be tracked are designated by





2 Decision Aloorit ha
The decision algorithm used by a system is
generally the most difficult portion of a system to define.
It is a complex function of people, training, morale,
procedures, doctrine, and equipment performance. Even when
the decision algorithm appears to be solely the judgment of
a single commander, it is usually influenced significantly
by the manner in which the sensor data is manipulated after
receipt and prior to presentation to the commander
3 . Da t a Base
Command and control systems employ a data base in
order to store information deferred for future reference
and to aid in the decision algorithm. This data base may
be composed of an automated data base system, maps,
overlays, or plotting boards. In systems involving
personnel, it also includes the experience and knowledge of
the individuals.
4
. Method of Communicat ion
Communication of decisions out of the system
includes electronic transmitters, but it also includes
verbal commands and reports. When "command by exception"
procedures are included, such as those adopted for fire
request coordination, a failure to co mmunicate can also




In order to be an effective control system, a
command and control system must include feedback to
determine the impact on the environment as a result of the
system actions. Note that this feedback can be considered
as a special component of the sensor inputs Esampie? of
feedback include enplicit feedback, such as messages frcm
maneuver units, and implicit feedback, such as r i d a r
observation of a change in an aircraft's speed or heading
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT
The discussion so far has centered on what functions
and elements comprise a command and control system As can
be deduced from the preceding discussion, a command and
control system is intimately tied to its environment.
Therefore, a discussion of the components of the
environment is now necessary.
1 . C ommunieat ions
As has been stated, communications receivers should
be considered as sensors. Let us now consider the
environment as a system using the model which has been used
to describe the co mmand and control system. Along this
line of reasoning, the communication information received
by the command and control system can be considered as an
output of the environment system. By the same argument,
the output of the comm and and control system decision can
be regarded as a sensor input to the environment system
17

2 . Perception versus Truth
Continuing to consider the environment as a system,
the data base can be considered to be the parameters of the
real environment. However, the environmental parameters
sensed by the command and control system are seldom totally
accurate, and at best comprise only a small subset of the
total parameters. Therefore, the decision process in the
environment system can be considered to act upon the
environmental parameters and produce an output to the
command and control system.
3 . Environmental Dynamics
The environment is not a static entity. It has
dynamic characteristics that are due to the interaction
with the command and control system and ones that are due
to influences external to the command and control system.
a. External Influences
Dynamics due to external influences are changes
such as the movement of units that are not controlled by
the command and control system and communications inputs to
the sy s t em
.
b. Response to Command and Control System
The movement of units in response to commands
from the command and control system and the resolution of
engagements initiated by the command and control system are
examples of dynamics due to the command and control system.
18

Both types of environmental dynamics can be
thought of as direct results of a decision algorithm within
the environment which responds to inputs from both the
command and control system, and Irom other esternal
sources .
D. GENERIC MODEL
The model presented so far is generally the same basic
model of a command and control system that I have observed
in most of the discussions and literature on command and
control . Th e only difference lies in the consideration of
the environment as a system itself. In this thesis, the
emphasis is on the modeling, simulation, and evaluation of
networks of systems, not the individual systems. In this
contest, a much simpler model 3 £ a single system can be
used. This model is given in Figure 2. At first glance,
this model appears to be too simplistic to be of an// use.
The decision algorithm and the data aase have been merged
into a single block, and the feedback element has become
just one of several input /output paths, with no explicit
correlation shown. However, is will be developed in
subsequent sections, the only aspects of the single system
which are of real importance in the context of networks of
systems is the understanding that there is a finite set of
inputs to the system from the environment, and that there















FIGURE 2. / Model of a Generic System
environment. It is also important to recognize that wh i 1 e
the s y s t em reacts only to the envir onmen t, the snviro nmen t
reacts to influences esternal to the system.
20

I 1 I - MODELING A NETWORK OF COMMAND
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
In this section, the model of an individual command and
control system which was developed in Section II will be
eKtended to address networks of systems.
A A CLASSICAL MODEL
Consider a network of four systems, such as air defense
systems interconnected fay both direct communications links
and by a switched message system. Figure 3 shows how this
arrangement would typically be portrayed. This type of
representation is a digraph with decision elements
represented as nodes, and communications paths portrayed by
graph edges.
i . £yst e:n No d e s
Three types of nodes are used in the graph Each
of the four systems is a single node. In addition, the
communications switching system, and the eHternal
environment are represented by distinct nodes.
2 . C ommunicat ions
Communications paths are modeled as edges in the
graph. However, the switched co mm unications requires
decisions to be made, and thus it is conveyed as both
edges, representing the inputs and outputs, and as a node,






FIGURE 3. Classical Model of C 2 Network
3 En v i r onmen t
The environment represents ail of the items
presented in the last section, except the communications
mentioned above.
B. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH
This type of model suffers from two problems when used
as a general model of a network of command and control
systems. First, it is not really flexible. Each of the
systems (nodes) has two types of edges, those that
represent communications links, and those which represent
interactions with the environment. When a system is added
22

to or deleted from the network model, the model used for
each node must be updated to reflect the changing edges
representing the communications. Secondly, it is not
compatible with the generic system model shown in Figure 2.






















FIGURE 4. Modified Model of C 2 Network
1 • Linkages as Part of the Environment
In this model, the linkages between systems are
modeled as inputs from the environment to the systems and
as outputs from the systems to the environment. Note that
each interconnection is only in one direction and that each
system interacts only with the environment. The model for
23

each node can be viewed as in Figure 2. In addition, since
there are no direct, interconnections between systems, there
is no need to change the model of the en
i
sting systems when
a system is added to or deleted from the network, or the
communications is rearranged.
2 C ommunxcat tons
In this model, it is necessary to enhance the model
of the environment in order to convey all of the in forma ton
found in the model of Figure 3. Specifically, the
environment decision algorithm must include decision rules
for the routing of communications data from an input to the
environment to the appropriate output to a system The
best way to visualise thij way in which the environment must
be modeled is to t: k a m l n e the entire model from the
perspective of the environment, as it views a single
system.
C. THE EXTERNAL VIEW
1 C omaunicit ions from the System
The communications coming from the system can be
viewed simply as inputs to the environment, as in the
single system model. The main point to be considered is
that the system simply sends the data to the environment
via one of its output paths. It is not necessary for the
individual system model to know the destination of the
data, other than a possible routing indicator for a
2 4

switched communications system. Once the data rea;h«is the
environment model, it can be routed to the input of another
system model, or it could be acted upon entirely within the
environment model.
2 . Communications to the System
The communications into the system are provided by
the environment without the individual system aod^i hiving
to know the source, other than a possible indicator, such
as a from data field, in the communicated information Of
course, the system also knows which sensor received the
communication. The environment can obtain the data from
either of two sources. It can be generated internally tc
the environment model, or it can be obtained as input f r on
one of the systems. Note that in the case where the dat;.
is obtain from a system, it can be considered as an
eaternal influence to the environment from the single





COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section will eunine how the performance of a
network of command and control systems can be evaluated.
A. A RESPONSE ORIENTED EVALUATION
In Section II, a command and control system was defined
as a system that makes a decision based upon a perception
of the environment, and then communicates this decision.
The same definition can be applied to a network of systems.
The only real difference is that a network of systems
should hopefully be able to use the increased assets
inherent in the network to develop a more accurate
ferception, thus yielding a "better" decision, and be able
to communicate decisions more effectively.
1 . A Stimulus and Response Model
Command and control systems and networks as they
have been defined herein are an enample of a stimulus and
response system The systems take their perception of the
environment as a stimulus and respond with a decision. The
stimulus and response can be traced by examining the data
passing between the systems and the environment. The
stimulus is the data input from the environment, and the
response is reflected in the data passed to the environment
26

by each system. The set co
n
prised of all of the inputs to
all of the systems constitutes the input to the network,
and the set of outputs from all of the systems constitutes
the response of the network. Generally, a single stimulus
from the environment will result in a response from one
system, which is provided.. via the environment, as a
stimulus to another system The second system will then
generate a response, and so en until the output of a system
is sent to the environment and is; not passed to another
system In this case, the network can be evaluated by
eaamining the final response compared to the initial
stimulus. In evaluating networks, two properties of the
response should be considered; its correctness and its
t ime 1 i ne s s . <
2 . Correctness of Response
Based upon the evalv. a v or's knowledge of the real
environment, often referred to as "ground truth", a
determination can be m a d a s. s to the most appropriate
response for the network to make Note that even if the
stimulus remains constant, different responses may be
eKpected depending upon the purpose of the evaluation. If
the objective is to develop tactics or doctrine, the
response should be considered based upon its contribution
to the achievement of a set of operational objectives.
However, if the evaluation is made to determine the
performance of a network within a given scenario or plan,
27

the eaisting doctrine and tactics must be used as one i t
the measures of the correctness of the response, instead of
asavariable.
3 Timeliness of Response
Each response has an associated time value This
response time is the time from the occurrence of the
stimulus to the communication of the final response The
meaning of a specific time value must be weighed with
respect to the value of the stimulus. A decision to assign
a weapon system to engage an incoming missile must be made
very rapidly. However, the detection of a surface ship at :.
range of several hundred miles may not require a time
critical decision.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CORRECTNESS OF RESPONSE
If the command and control network and the individual
systems are to be evaluated based upon the response to a
stimulus, it is necessary to identify the contributing
factors in arriving at the response. This will allow for
analysis of where corrective measures should be applied to
the network in order to improve the response value o r
timeliness. The first area to be examined is the set of
factors influencing the correctness of the response. As
was stated previously, the response of the network is the
result of the series of responses made by individual
systems. Therefore, it is sufficient at this point to
23

eKamine the factors contributing to the response from a
s i ng i e syst em
.
1 Accuracy of Perception
The response to the stimulus is obviously based
upon a perception of the nature of the stimulus, or
environment in this case. Previously, it was stated that
the system does not see the environment as it really
•lists. Instead, it only sees a subset of the
characteristics i and may not sea these characteristics
accurately. In order to properly identify the stimulus,
the system's perception of the environment must include all
of the characteristics of the environment that influence
the response. It is also equally important for these
characteristics to be perceived accurately. If one of
these two conditions is not met, it could be the result of
either a deficiency in the system's sensors, or it could be
the result of inaccurate data forwarded by another system.
Note that one consequence of the latter case is that a
system could provide accurate responses in one network, but
fail totally in another network due to interactions with
other systems. Thus, no system should be ignored in the
analysis of a network simply because it performs well in
other ne two r k s
.
2 . Availability of Supporting Information
Given that the system obtains a sufficiently
accurate perception of the environment, it must use the
29

local database to support the decision algorithm. The
local database may or may not contain the needed data, and
as with sensor data, it may or may not be accurate if it is
present. Inaccurate information in the database can result
from storing inaccurate sensor inputs or it can result from
improper processing of previous inputs.
3 . Decision Algorithm
The sensor and database data is acted upon by the
decision algorithm in the system. Obviously, errors in
this algorithm will introduce errors in the response.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE
The timeliness of the response of a system is the sum
of two factors, the time for the system < o detect the
occurrence of the stimulus, and the time required for the
system to determine the response after the stimulus has
been detected. An analysis of these fa c tors usually
includes a couples analysis of the communications delays in
the network. But if the edges in the model are treated as
instantaneous transfers of data, the communications delay
analysis becomes a special case of the general system
analysis, since the delays are introduced by either a
communications system represented by a node in the model,
or by the decision algorithm in the environment, which is
modeled as a system.
30

1 Routing through Network
The time for the system to detect the stimulus can
be generated by either or both of two factors. The first
factor is the time required for other systems in the
network to process and forward their results. The second
factor is the time required for the system sensors to
integrate the data once it is present at the sensor. For
example, a normal search radar will average half of the
rotation period in order to detect a target after it enters
the coverage of the radar. Before, it was mentioned that a
stimulus xs in the form of a set of characteristics of the
environment. The individual elements of this set do not
always come from the same sensor or source, and thus could
easily be subjected to different time delays in arriving at
the system. Since all of the elements are necessary to the
decision algorithm, the last of the elements to become
available to the system determines the delay in detecting
the s t i mu 1 us
.
2 . Time to Determine Response
Within the system, the time required to arrive at a
decision by the decision algorithm and to communicate this
decision can be divided into three components.
a. Input Queue
The inputs from the sensors are queued in the
system waiting for the decision algorithm to act upon them.
This can easily be seen in a typical manual command post as
31

the incoming message traffic piles up waiting for action
officers to become available. Each system will have a
different queue policy, ranging from a simple first in
first out processing to complex prioritization schemes.
b. Processing Time
Each decision requires a finite amount of time
for processing by the decision algorithm. Continuing the
example of the co mm c, nd post, this represents the time
during which the action officer is acting on the message
c. Output Queue
Finally, :he decision is subjected to another
queue upon being celeased from the decision algorithm for
communication In t hi example, this is represented by the
time required for the response message to be formatted and
transmitted It also includes the time spent waiting for





USING THE MODEL AS A BASIS FOR SIMULATION
This section shows how the previously presented model
can be used as a basis for the simulation of a network of
command and control systems. The discussion wiil center
upon the use of computer technology to provide the basis of
the s imu 1 a t i on
.
A. SINGLE SYSTEM SIMULATION
Recall the single system model of command and control
that was presented in Figure 2. Using this model, a
simulation of the system can be constructed with a logical
structure as presented in Figure 5. It is important to
note that this structure is designed to allow ths inalyst
to view the individual system from a stimulus and response
point of view. There is no desire at this level to examine
the internal operation of the system A comple'c* analysis
of the system would require additional tools to e s a o. i n e the
internal dynamics of the system. The primary purpose of
the structure in Figure 5 is as a building block to be used
in simulating networks of systems.
There are three components in the simulation. The
simulation of the environment will be discussed later, as
will the interface process. The model and the simulation











FIGURE 5. Siiigie System Simulation
but it is not necessary for the simulation of the system to
be a computer simulation. This is true even when the other
two components are implemented on a computer. As presented
in Section II, a single individual can be regarded as a
command and control system. In this case, it would be much
simpler, and probably much more realistic, to present
information from the interface process directly to an
individual for evaluation and to relay the responses back
to the interface process. The only restriction that really
applies to the system simulation is that it must be
designed to accept the data provided by the interface
process, and must provide output data in the format
3 4

aspect ed by the inticfiea process. Other thin this
restriction, the simulation cun be implemented by any
available technique, to include mathematical models,
computer simulation, manned simulators, or an actual
sy s t em
.
B. NETWORK SIMULATION
The extension of the single system simulation to the
simulation of a network of s y s : e m s will be presented by
examining an example case. This example will then be
extended to the general case. Consider a network of three
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r IGUR!E 6. An Excimp)le Network
35

Using the model in Figure 4, and the general structure of
Figure 5, we can simulate the network with the logical
structure given in Figure 7. Each of the simulations for












FIGURE 7. Simulation of Network
four weapons systems do not appear as part of the command
and control network in the simulation. As discussed
earlier, these components are part of the environment
simulation. Thus, it becomes evident that the manner in
which the environment is simulated will have a major impact
on the validity of the entire simulation.
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C SIMULATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
1 I tems to be Simulated
What elements of the environment should be
simulated in this eHample, and how should the simulation be
structured? As stated above, each of the weapons systems
must be simulated. It is also necessary to simulate the
actions cf opposing units and other friendly units. It may
also be r.ecessary to simulate such environmental factors as
weather, time of day, and terrain if these factors
influence the simulation of other elements such as unit
movement or sensor performance.
Cne of the most difficult parts of the environment
simulation will be in the handling of the system sensors
for each system. As mentioned in previous sections, a
real ist i c simulation of the various parameters of the
en v i r onm<»n t is insufficient. Each sensor will have a view
of inly a subset of this enviro nme nt. In addition, two
sensors looking at the same subset of environmental
parameters may still arrive at two different perceptions of
the environment, since each sensor will not sense the
parameters with the same accuracy. Different sensors will
also assign different interpretations to the same parameter
values. Thus it is necessary for the environment
simulation to filter and modify the environment parameters
before they are presented to the system simulations. This
is especially true if the system is simulated by a person
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or part of an actual command and control system. In this
case, the simulation of the system cannot b<» used to modify
the parameters. If, on the other hand, a system simulation
is designed strictly for use in the network simulation, the
parameter filtering can be accomplished either as part of
the environment simulation, or as a task within the system
simulation. The former method provides more £ leaibi Iity
since many types of sensor technological changes can be
accommodated with no change in the s / s t em simulation. An
example of such a change could be an improvement in the
accuracy of the location reported for a target.
Another component of the environment that must be
considered is the set of characteristics of the seven
communications links within the networi'. Since these
characteristics may be variable, and .Have a major impact on
the overall performance of the networi:, they must be
accounted for. Depending upon the level of examination, it
is reasonable to consider them as either part of the output
task within a system simulation, or to represent the link
as a separate simulation parameter in the environment. The
latter appears to be a more general approach. It allows
the channel characteristics to be modified to account for
technological, environmental, or procedural change without




Recall that earlier it was stated that the
environment could be regarded as a system for purposes of
modeling and analysis. When the proliferation of
environmental parameters is examined, it appears to be more
reasonable to consider the environment as a network: of
interacting systems. Since a method of simulating a
network of systems has already been presented to simulate a
command and control network, it seems reasonable to see if
this same methodology could be applied to the simulation of
the environment. When the methodology is extended, it
results in a logical configuration like that in Figure 8
Figure 8 reveals an interesting result of this
approach. It no longer matters whether a given individual
simulation or task is part of the environment, or whether
it is part of the command and control network under
examination. This is a rather subtle, but extremely
powerful result. It means that if the structure presented
can be implemented, then several apparently divergent
problems can be solved economically as a group. Consider
an analyst trying to determine the vulnerability of a US.
command and control system to Soviet counter command and
control measures. In this case, the U.S. system is the
network under examination, and a network of Soviet systems
is part of the envir onmen t. Now consider another analyst






























































FIGURE 8. Tasks for Example Network
command and control measures. Now the Soviet network is
the network under enamination, and the US systems are
part of the environment. However, since the interface
process doesn't need to distinguish between the network
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under examination and the tasks that comprise the
environment, the same simulations could conceivably be used
in both instances if they provide the prop it level of
s imu 1 a t i on
.
D. THE INTERFACE PROCESS
It should have been apparent from Figure 8 that the
interface process can very easily have numerous connections
to a multitude of simulation tasks. In fact, every input
to or output from a simulation task is connect ad to the
interface process. As the hub of the entire simulation,
the interface process is the prime determinant of the
overall characteristics of the simulation environment.
Environment in this case refers to the external structure
within which the simulation exists, as opposed to the
command and control environment that is simulated as part
of the overall simulation. The majority of t h ? remainder
of this thesis will be devoted to the necessary
characteristics and functions of this process
1 Funct ions
Figure 9 shows one of many possible configurations
for the routing of data within the interface process for
the example of Figure 8. Even for this relatively small
example, the routing of information is obviously a major
function to be implemented by the interface process. Note
that there are two types of links There are one-to-one
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FIl;URE 9. Example Links Betwee n 1"as;ks
another single task. There are also one-to-many links
where the output of a single task goes to multiple
destination tasks. There are also many-to-one and
many-to-many links, but these are logically equivalent to
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sets of one-to-ons or one- to -many links. Thus, the two
types are sufficient.
Recall that the purpose of the simulation is to
analyze a network of command and control systems with
respect to a stimulus and response model as presented in
Section IV. Recall also that all of the information
necessary to accomplish this task is present at the inputs
and outputs of the t a s ic s comprising the simulation of the
network. Thus, it is desirable that the interface process
provide a way to capture the content of the logical
1 inkages .
Obviously, it is not desirable to capture data
passing across each logical link. Also, the linkages
associated with a t*a sk s. r e dependent upon the specific
instance of its use in a simulation. It is necessary to
establish and to modify the operation of the interface in a
manner that is independent of the simulation tasks that are
being interfaced. This .aeans that the interface process
must implement an interface control mechanism for use by
the esperiment controller.
2 . Impl eme ntil ion
The following implementation is presented as a
method for accomplishing the three fundamental interface
process tasks of logical linkage, data capture, and
control. At this point the assumption is made that the
interface process is implemented on a computer system, as
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are each of the simulation tasks. A methodology will be
given in a later section for the case where the simulation
tasks are not computer based.
Let the interface process be implemented >s a
process at the utility program or supervisor level in the
computer system. This allows it to be accessible to a.'. 1
other tasks, and to have access to the computer system's
I/O structure. The need for the I/O structure access will
become obvious later in the thesis.
Whenever a task begins execution, it accesses the
interface process and passes a logical identification to
the interface process The method of accessing the
interface process is obviously an item which is very
dependent upon the computer system utilized. It is crucial
that the identification be unique. For instance, if an li:
defense battalion was being simulated, copies of the same
task could be used for each of the firing batteries.
However, each would require a separate logical
identification so that the batteries could be distinguished
by the control interface.
Whenever a task "opens" a communications link with
the interface process, this link is assigned a logical
name. For output links, the assigned name is the name of
an address list with which the link should be associated.
There is no requirement for a given address list to be
unique to a particular output channel. Input links are
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named with a name that is unique within the task. This
name is concatenated with the task identifier to obtain a
unique channel name. One of the tasks to be accomplished
by the control function will be the mapping of address
lists to the channel names. To do so, the control function
will maintain a list of one or more channel names to be
used for each logical address Whenever data is received
from a task by the interface process, the data is sent to
each input channel whose name is on the address list
associated with the output channel. This allows both
one-to-one and one-to-many links to be implemented by the
same mechanism It also allows data which is generated,
bu: no* needed in the specific simulation being considered
to be discarded. This is accomplished by putting no
entries in the address list. The interface process must
i [ low a given channel name to appear in multiple address
'. : s t s . This ensures that the logical many-to-one and
many-ta-many links can be implemented
Returning to the example of Figure 9, consider the
four weapon unit tasks. The tasks can be initiated with
the logical names unit_l, unit_2, unit_3, and unit_4 If
each of the units is simulated by the same program, the
input channels will be assigned common logical link names.
Let these names be weather, comm, and location for the
inputs from the weather, link, and friendly forces tasks,
respectively. The logical link names are concatenated with
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the task logical names to produce 12 unique channel names,
unit_l weather, unit_i. coram
, unit_l. location, ..., and
unit_4. location. The output from each weapon unit task can
be assigned to address list damage. Since the names are
not unique, the output from ali four tasks is merged into a
single data stream. If a separation had been desired, the
tasks themselves would have to concatenate the task name,
since only input names are automatically concatenated. The
interface process knows that address 1 i s t damage contains
the channel names o p p o s i n g . d ama g e and friendly, damage .
These are the input channels for the two forces tasks. The
manner in which the interface process kr.ows the members of
the address list will be discussed la. er.
The address list scheme will also solve the data
capture problem. All that is necessary ': o capture the data
from a given link is to initiate a cask that will operate
on, or record, the data for a given link, and then to open
an input channel from the interface process. Adding the
channel name for the data capture task to the appropriate
address lists will complete the function by capturing the
data regardless of changes in the tasks associated with the
link. Continuing with the eaample above, add a log task to
the simulation with an input channel log. damage which is
used to receive damage data for recording. Simply adding
log damage to the address list damage will allow the data
to be copied at log in addition to the forces tasks
46

The contr-ol function can be implemented in much the
same manner. Design the control function as a collection
of cooperating tasks. Figure 10 is a possible




























































and host equipment. An individual task can be considered
as being of one of two types. The first type is a task
which must be present and logically connected to other
tasks when the interface process begins execution. These
tasks would include tasks which perform address list
maintenance, tasks which physically route the information
between input and output channels, tasks for initiating
other tasks, and tasks for opening channels. These tasks
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wiil hereafter be called primary control tasks, or simply
primary tasks. All other control tasks are secondary
control tasks. These tasks include the tasks which
interface the test controller to the interface process.
(The test controller could be a human operator, a team of
operators, or another computer process.) Assume that the
linkages between primary tasks are fixed and are
established at task creation time as in a conventional
process. The linkages among the secondary control tasks
and between t h <s primary and secondary tasks can be
implemented using the interface process itself. Let the
input and output channels associated with each primary task
be named by a fined convention, and place each of the input
channel name-j on at least one address list which is also
named by convention. Each channel of each primary task is
now accessible tc any process that can access the interface
process This means that the exact configuration of the
control function is determined by the selection of
secondary control tasks, and their linkage to the primary
tasks Thus, it is easy to viitualize the control function
to suit individual requirements and to add tasks as
necessary to meet unique control problems for a given test
env i r onmen t .
3 . Task Similarity
Note that as far as the interface process is
concerned, the tasks that comprise the simulation, the
48

tasks that implement the data, capture function; and the
secondary control functions all appear the- same. This
means that in subsequent discussion of task linkages, it is
only necessary to discuss four cases;
a. primary task to primary task,
b. primary task to secondary task,
c. secondary task to primary task:, «.nd
d. secondary task to secondary task
Since the latter three cases are implemented
identically via the interface process, thece are really
only two cases to consider; primary task to primary task,
and all others Hereafter, the term secondary * a s k will be
used to collectively refer to all tasks other -han primary





A MODEL OF A DISTRIBUTED SIMULATION
In this section, the methodology of Section V will be
extended to the distributed simulation of networks of
command and control systems.
A WHY DISTRIBUTED SIMULATION?
The simulation methodology presented in Section V is a
logical network of tasks. This network could be
implemented in a single computer, if the computer could
support all of the processing required. An examination of
the size and processing requirements of even a modest
single system simulation leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the representation of any significant level of detail
in the systems comprising a. network will result in an
enormous processing load. The time needed to accomplish a
simulation on a single computer makes a strong case for
using multiple computers in a distributed processing
arrangement. As used here, distributed processing refers
to any collection of two or more processors processing
components of the same problem. This includes colocated
computers operating on a multiprocessor bus or local area
network and also includes geographically dispersed systems
connected by a long haul communications network. It also
covers the hybrid systems resulting from networking
5

geographically dispersed processing ncdes. The individual
processing nodes can be individual computers, local
networks or a multiprocessor configuration.
Although the purely technical issues argue for a
distributed arrangement, there are other strong reasons for
a network. Recall the problems discussed briefly in
Section 1. One of the problems was the amount of time that
it takes for the development of a i ;>st system. In a
distributed system, an organization with a functional
requirement closely related to one already acco mm o d a t e d
within the network only needs to develop minimal
modifications, and a capability to access the network, in
order to obtain an initial simulation capability. The
technical aspects of the approach are presented in this
section and in Sections VII and VIII, The management
aspects are presented in Section IX.
The second problem area concerned the retention of
technical eKpertise by the staff members of the
organisations conducting the si mu I a t i ons . Th is problem is
usually manifested in the area of scenario development.
Due to the research and staffing that must go into a
scenario in order to make it acceptable to all of the
parties which are reviewing it, very few scenarios are ever
developed by any organization. These are usually just
variations of a single master scenario. The use of a
distributed simulation with all of these organizations
5 1

participating would allow the sharing of both the data
bases that define the scenario environment, and the
processes which control and distribute the scenarios.
A distributed network also provides a significant
capability to organizations which normally would have no
simulation capability. Analysis organisations within the
services typically have insufficient computer assets for
command and control network simulation. However, they
usually have highly refined statistical analysis tools. By
adding these organizations to a network, they gain access
to simulations, and the organizations which are developing
the simulations can concentrate on the simulations, knowing
that the analysis tools have been debugged and have been
made available for use.
B. LOCATION INDEPENDENCE
The key to making a distributed network feasible is to
make the logical connectivity of a task independent of it's
physical location. The solution is represented in Figure
11. The primary control tasks are augmented and are
replicated in each of the network processors. Any task I/O
that is passed to the interface process in any processor is
passed to the proper tasks, in whichever processors they
ma y reside.
Let the primary tasks in each processor have functional







































FIGURE 11. A Distributed Architecture
other processors. Mote that it is not necessary for the
primary tasks to directly control all of the links. The
actual protocol and line handling could be implemented by
an operating system utility or network co mmunicat ions
package. It is essential though, that none of the
secondary tasks has direct access to the communications
1 inks .
At least three methods are now possible for routing I/O
to the proper task. The method actually utilised is a




The first method is the least complex, but also the
least flexible. When a task is initiated, the logical
address used to identify it within address lists will
contain a processor identifier. Thus, the primary
interface tasks always know the identity of tha destination
processors. Data is routed to each of the target
processors, where it is passed to the primary inter!: ace
tasks for routing to the proper tasks Of course,
efficiency of communications dictates that the transmission
to multiple tasks at the same processor would only result
in one data transmission, with multiple copies b <s i n g
generated at the receiving processor
In the second methodology, every I/O transaction is
broadcast to all other processors, addressed to the address
list name. The primary tasks in each processor check the
specified address list for local tasks and p-iis the data to
tasks as appropriate. Many local networks and
interprocessor buses use a broadcast m e t n o d for
distributing data on a ring or star network. When this is
the case, this methodology is a very simple and flexible
alternative. Of course, this method suffers from obvious
deficiencies in geographically distributed networks with
limited bandwidth between processors.
The third approach is for each processor to keep a copy
of all address lists being used by local tasks. A special
address list, named by convention, would broadcast to all
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processors as in method two above. One use of this special
address list would be for the dissemination of changes to
normal address lists. A secondary task, named by
convention, would maintain a master copy of all address
lists. When the primary tasks in a given processor needed
to initiate a new address list, they would obtain the
initial list from the secondary task. The lists wouid
identify logical names and processors for each task.
Although conceptually the most complex, this is the most
flesible approach. It allows tasks to migrate among the
processors from eaecution to execution of the simulation,
or even during a given execution. At the same time, it
minimizes the problem of channel bandwidth by keeping local
subsets of the routing information. In the event of'
a
failure that removes the master copy of all address lists
from the network, the list can be reconstructed by merging
all of the local subsets which remain in the surviving
portion of the network.
Combinations of the above approaches are also feasible.
For instance, either method one or method three could be
used to route data between two local networks, and then
method two could be used within each local network.
Note that only the primary tasks within the interface
process need to be replicated within each processor. All
other tasks are needed only once within the network, and
may logically reside anywhere.
55

C. BEYOND A CLOSED SYSTEM
All of the tasks discussed so far have been assumed to
have the ability to communicate with the interface process.
However, there are simulation capabilities which must be
considered for incorporation in any serious effort to
simulate a command and control network, but which cannot
communicate directly with the interface process. Two
examples will be given.
Over the years, each of t h e services has developed a
large inventory of manned simulators. These systems
provide excellent capabilities for simulating bom command
and control systems and weapons systems However, these
systems generally reside on dedicated hardware, often
without any operating system primitives beyond a simple
monitor and bootstrap Loader. It would be difficult, and
probably imprudent, to modify them to incorporate the
interface processes presented herein.
Fortunately most of these systems were designed for, or
have been modified for. stimulation and monitoring by
external computer systems The term stimulation is often
confused with the term simulation. A system is simulated
by a process which models the actions produced in the
simulated system. A system is stimulated by providing an
input (or possibly a lack of an input) which causes the
system to react in some manner, predictably or otherwise.
These computer interfaces provide the key to utilizing

these systems in the simulation network. A ta>x can be
created that maps the simulator interface to the interface
required by the interface process, as shown in Figure XI.





FIGURE 12. Utilizing Manned Simulators
simulator, and results in the simulator being addressed as
if it was a single task, people and all.
The second example is when it is desired to monitor the
exact exchange of data which is occurring between two
tactical systems. In this case, the tactical interface
must be as close to the tactical employment as possible.
Use of the interface process would disturb the timing and
handshaking characteristics of the interface and result in
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invalidation of the entire test. However, it is desired to
collect the data and analyze it using network assets. The
solution here is similar to that above, and is shown in













FIGURE 13. Capturing Tactical Data Streams
by any suitable means and is passed to a computer task that
m e s : s the interface process criteria. The data is now
available throughout the network.
This basic methodology can be used for many tasks which
are not directly suitable for the interface process,
including simulations which are not computer based.
C omman d posts are often simulated simply by a staff of
people and some rudimentary communications for receiving
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stimuli and relaying decisions. If a computer terminal is
used for the communications, possibly staffed by a test
controller, then the stimuli can be released by a task in
the network simulation, and the results f a e d back into the
network. All that is needed is a suitable interface task




VII. CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMULATIONS
There are many existing simulations which could be
adapted to the methodology presented in the previous
sections. However, the basic characteristics of these
simulations are dissimilar. These dissimilarities arise as
a result of both the characteristics of the item being
simulated, and as a result of the individual preferences of
the simulation designer. These dissimilarities can be
expected to continue in any tasks which might be developed
specifically for the presented methodology. Two of the
characteristics are significant to the simulation model.
These are the time line basis of the simulation task, and
the conventions that are used to pass information between
the various tasks. These characteristics of simulations,
and their impact on the simulation model, will be esamined
in this section.
A. TIME LINE CONSIDERATIONS
Simulations generally are time line classified into one
of two categories, time step or event step.
1 Time Step Simulations
In a time step simulation, the task is given the
state of the simulated phenomenon at a specific point in
time The task then calculates the state at a specific
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time interval later in time. As an eaample, consider the
simulation of the movement of an aircraft. The task would
know the aircraft's position, heading, rite of
climb/descent, and velocity at some initial time, t
o
Based upon some time increment t
, the task would computed
the aircraft position at time t + t
_,
. During the neat
o a
iteration, the position would be computed a* time t +2t
,
o d
and so forth. Typically, in this type of simulation,
changes in heading, rate of c 1 i mb / d es c en t , or velocity can
only be made at time t +it . for some nonnegative integer
o d
i .
2 • Event Step Simulation
Note that if changes in heading, rate of
climb/descent, or velocity occur infrequently, a period of
linear aircraft motion is calculated as an accumulation of
short segments cf motion. If the time of the first
aircraft maneuver is known to be t + 2 t
,
, the location of
o d
the aircraft when initiating this maneuver can be
calculated directly from time t in one step by using
o
t'=20QGt.. This requires considerably less work. This is
the idea behind the event step simulation approach. A list
of events (the maneuver in this example), and their time of
occurrence is maintained. The state of the simulated
phenomenon is calculated for the time of the nest
chronological event, based upon the state at the last event
time. The prime disadvantage of this approach is that the
6 1

time of occurrence of ill events must be known in advance
This can often be very complicated to compute For
example, consider an early warning aircraft operating in an
environment that includes several other aircraft and some
opposing electronic warfare assets. As the various
aircraft maneuver, when will aircraft be detected or lost
by the early warning radar?
B. INFORMATION PASSING CONVENTIONS
There is an obvious need for the various t i <s '< s within a
simulation to pass information among themselves The
proper method for accomplishing this function is not so
obvious. One of two methods is generally used. These
methods are message passing and the use of a comm on data
base.
1 . Message Passing
One approach to data passing is to transfer items
of data directly from one task to another. This can be
implemented in a number of ways depending upon the specific
equipment suite. One common method is t h a passing of
parameters in a subroutine call. Another is the
establishment of a queue where records are deposited by one
task, and retrieved by another. The essence of the process
is that task 1 calculates some element of data and sends it
to task 2 directly across some logical channel of
communication. This approach is simple, but there are some
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very rigid assumptions that must be met in order to avoid
disaster. First, task 2 must be able to process the
received data at a greater rate than it is produced by task
1. In some cases this may have to be ace omm odated by
allowing task 2 to simply dump or ignore messages when
overloaded. Secondly, task 1 must generate the data in the
order in which it is needed by task 2. When the order in
which task 2 requires data is not fined, nor predictable by
task 1 , it becomes necessary to establish some sort of
handshaking so that task 2 can pass it's requirements for
data to task 1. This is usually implemented by a message
passing channel from task 2 to task 1.
2 . C ommon Data Bases
Consider the following tasks. Task 1 calculates
the current position of a ship Task 2 calculates helm
commands for the same ship. It is obvious that task 1
requires the current location, heading, and speed of the
ship in order to calculate a new location. Task 2 needs
the location, heading, speed, and other data that possibly
includes mission orders and the location of other vessels,
in order to calculate a new heading or speed. In the
c o mm on data base approach to information passing, a data
base would be established that included at least the
location, heading, and speed fields. Task 1 and task 2
would both have access to this data base Whenever task 1
calculates a new location, it simply updates the location
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field of the data base When task 2 needs a location for
the ship, it simply reads the value in the location field.
New helm commands result in a change to either the heading
or the speed fields, and are i mmediately available to task
1. The two tasks can thus function asynchronously. The
approach is not without problems however. Whenever task 2
needs a location value, it must queiy the data base because
the value may have been updated Th is doesn't cause a
problem with two tasks and only 2 data fields. But as the
number of tasks with common data fields increases and the
size of the comm on data bases grows, it may be necessary to
utilize secondary storage for t h a s a data bases. Depending
upon the equipment and operating system used, these
numerous references to the data bases can be severely
limited by the bandwidth of the char, nels available for
access to the data bases. Configuration management can
also be a problem. Whenever the structure of a data base
is modified, the location of data needed by a given task is
modified. There are several methods for minimizing this
i mp act. Th e mo st popular approach in recent years is the
use of tasks, often called information hiding modules,
which accept logical data requests from the task and
provide the logical to physical mapping and retrieve the
desired data. Although simple in theory, this approach
simply moves the point at which the modification must be
64





As shown above, each of the time line and information
passing methods has advantages and disadvantages, and none
is best suited to all simulation tasks that ate to be
performed. Therefore, the network simulation methodology
must accommodate tasks based upon each of these approaches
if it is to be useful.
A important question is whether or not there is a
legitimate need to m i a both time line methods, or both
information passing methods in a single simulation of a
network. Consider the previous example of the early
warning aircraft. It would appear that a time step
simulation is best for the movement of the aircraft. Radar
detection can be computed each time interval and the
problem of predicting the time of detection is avoided. In
many conceivable simulations, the movement of the hostile
aircraft would be predetermined and the maneuvers stored in
a scenario. The task which reads the scenario and sends
the maneuvers to the time step aircraft motion task is most
easily implemented as an event step task. Thus, the two
time line methods might be encountered in a single network
s imu 1 a t i on
.

Consider the simulation of two command and control
systems which are tracking a number of aircraft. Further
assume that the best method for the passing of location to
the system simulations is via a common data base in this
case Mow consider the simulation of a communication
channel that carries track update messages between the two
systems. An important aspect of this channel is the order
in which the information is passed, since this affects the
processing by the receiving system. Thus, the message
passing methodology appears to be ideal for this case. In
conclusion, both information passing methodologies might be
present in a single network simulation.
D. MAKING INTERFACES COMPATIBLE
In Section VI, it was stated that individual tasks
could be developed independently, and that they could
reside within different test system elements. These ideas
will form the basis for eaamining the issues associated
with the interfacing of tasks. The interfaces will be
characterized into general types based upon the
characteristics presented in this section.
All interfaces examined in this section will be assumed
to be a one to one, single direction interface used to
transfer information from task 1 to task 2 , as shown in
Figure 14. Note that the interface process is not shown,
and it will si mp ly be assumed for the remainder of this
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section. When two tasks are selected for us* in a network
simulation, they must satisfy a set of assumptions before
an interface can be established. These- assumptions are
independent of whether or not the tasks ate selected "off
the shelf", or are developed for the simulation.
The set of inputs required by task 2 mu 5 t be a subset
of the outputs from task 1. Mote that the sets do not have
to be identical. When the output of task 1 contains, but
exceeds, the input requirements for task 2, it is a simple
matter to filter the output of task 1, as s hown in Figure
15. When the output of task 1 does not contain all of the







FIGURE 15. Task Interface Filtering
satisfied by one or more additional tasks as shown in
Figure 16. However, for the remainder of the section, this
case will be assumed to have been decomposed into two or
more separate logical inputs to task 2.
The data input requirements of task 2 must be expressed
in the same terms as the data output from task 1. As an
example where this is not the case, task 1 might provide an
aircraft altitude in meters, while task 2 expects to
receive the altitude in feet. If the first assumption has
been satisfied, this assumption can usually be satisfied by
converting the improper data items to the desired terms, as




















f:[GURE ].6. Ccimposit e T ask Input
The reraainiiis 2isunpt ions arise as a result of the
characteristics of thi* individual tasks involved. The task
characteristics will be examined separately for the time
line and information passing combinations. This is
possible because the assumptions required are independent
and do not result from mutual considerations.
1 • Time Line Interfacing
a. Time Step to Time Step
When two time step tasks are interfaced, the
time step of task 2 should be at least as great as that of
task 1 . If not, the situation shown in Figure 18 can











FIGURE 17. Task Interface Translation
accomplished using information which is not current. Th
e
ideal case is when both tasks have the same starting txroe,
and the same time step. No time is wasted computing
unneeded time steps by task 1, and task 2 always ha a the
most current information. When task 2 has a greater time
step than task 1, it should be much greater, or an integer
multiple of, the task 1 time step. This will ensure
current information in the case of an integer multiple, or
information with insignificant aging in the case of much
greater time step. When the step in task 2 eaceeds the
step in task 1, the filter task on the channel must be made
aware of the relationship between the time steps. This is
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start of task 2 Intervals
FIGURE 18. Currency of Time Step
to Time Step Interface
necessary so that the unwanted time steps can be extracted
from the task 1 output, while the current update is passed
to task 2
.
b. Tims Step to Event Step
When a time step task passes data to an event
step task, the translation task on the link must convert
the output of task 1 into an event to be executed at a
specified time. This can be accomplished in a couple of
manners. The first is to treat each output from task 1 as
an event to be executed at the end of the current time
step. This essentially forces the event step task into the
time step mode. This loses the efficiency that event step
7 1

tasks gain from avoiding multiple identical calculations
that sum to a result directly obtainable. The other
approach is for the translation task to monitor successive
outputs from task 1 and to only generate an event when
there is a change in the d 3 t a . In any case, this type of
interface should be examined very carefully to avoid
introducing side effects into t*ie simulation.
c. Event Step to Event S : e p
There are no real concerns when interfacing
event step tasks to event step t a s k s . This assumes, of
course, that the selection of the tasks is logically
consistent with the simulation objective. The integration
of several independently developed event step tasks is very
difficult. This is because the essientially asynchronous
manner in which the events are generated and executed makes
side effects and logical inconsistencies very difficult to
predict or resolve
d Event Step to Tim.* Step
This case is like the time step to time step
interface with a variable time step for task 1. As such,
it is susceptible to the data currency problems wh en the
step times are not matched. Since this mismatch is a
transient condition, it can be frustrating to detect and
correct. This type of interface is only recommended in one
circumstance. This is when task 1 only affects data items
which are discrete in time, and which cannot vary without
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task 1 producing a new output. As an en ample, the location
of a ship is a parameter which varies continuously in time
If task 1 generates a location, and task 2 uses it, then
there is a problem of task 2 not having current input
values. However, the heading of the ship is usually
treated as an instantaneously changing value, and is
discrete in time. If task 1 generates a heading, task 2
can continue to use the same most recently received heading
for several time steps without creating a problem. This
assumes that task 1 will be executed whenever the heading
changes. It may be necessary for the translation task to
remember the most recent data from task 1 and repeat it for
each time step of task 2.
e. Tasks Without Time Line
Some tasks have no time line. An example; might
be a task which given a missile type, a target ship class,
and an impact aspect computes battle damage. These types
of tasks are best thought of as subtasks within one or more
tasks. Because they execute i mm ediately and post results
immediately, they generally present no problems other than
the information passing problems discussed below.
2 . Information Passing Interfacing
a. Message to Message
The interface process makes the interfacing of
two tasks utilizing messages to pass information very easy.
The interface between a task and the interface process is
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essentially accomplished by message passing. Thus, a
message passing scheme is already present in each element
of the simulation network. The only problems arise when
task 1 espects to send messages directly to task 2, but
task 2 espects to retrieve messages from a queue which
buffers inputs. In this case, a task should be inserted
into the logical channel in order to accept the messages
from task 1, and to queue- them for task 2.
b. Message to Data Base
The message passing task to common data base
task is also very simple. Task 1 passes the information
via message to the translation task, which must be
coresident with the data base. The translation task
inserts the data into the data base, where it is available
to task 2, as giver-, in section c following
c. Data Base to Data Base
ProLiams arise in the data base to data base
task interface. If task 1 and task 2 are not coresident,
only one of the tasks, if either, can be coresident with
the data base. The data base itself can be used as the
filter task, but the translation task must still be
accounted for. The solution is to create a data base
access task for each of the tasks, as in Figure 19. Task 1
passes data base updates to access task 1 , which is
coresident with the data base, as messages. The access
task performs any necessary translation and updates the
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data base. Task 2 requests desired data from access task I
via a message. The access task reads the data base ,
translates the data, and sends the results via messa-je to
task 2. The portions of task 1 and task 2 which i n t a - f a c *
to the data base will have to be modified, but this is a
problem that is inherent in using data base information
passing. What is important is that the essential feature
of the data base methodology, the data sequence
independence between task 1 and task 2, has been preserved.
d. Data Base to Message
The most complicated interface to implement is
when task 1 uses a common data base to pass information,
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and task 2 uses messages. Two cases exist. In the first,
task 2 expects certain information at specified times,
regardless of whether the data has changed since the last
n.essage was received. This is typical of many tasks of a
time step simulation. Figure 20 provides a general

















approach. Task 1 updates the data base as described in
section c. A translation task coresident with the data
base reads the data base at the required time, and sends a
message to task 2. In the second case, task 2 expects a
message only when a data item has changed. In this case,
shown in Figure 21, the translation task must be notified
by the task 1 access task after a data item has been
7 6












FIGURE 21. Data Base to Message
Interface, ca<:e 2
modified. The translation tasV then collects the necessary
data and sends a message to task 2.
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VIII. REAL WORLD CONSIDERATIONS
There are several problems which will have to be
addressed in each simulation implemented using a
distributed simulation approach. The purpose of this
section is to discuss a few of the more difficult of these
c omm on problem areas. It is important to realize that
these are problems which must ultimately be addressed by
the simulation designer, not by the network methodology.
They are mentioned here primarily because they are common
to many of the simulations which logically might be solved
using the approach of a distributed simulation. Therefore,
one or more of these problems will generally have to be
solved before the approach can be used. These problems a r e
also included for another reason. Experience would
indicate that there is no solution to any of the problems
which has general acceptance among the tactical command and
control co mm unity. Thus, the manner in which these
problems are addressed will be one of the prime
determinants in establishing how useful a task will be to
other community members
A. SECURITY
Computer security in general is an incomplete
discipline. There are several theoretical approaches
7 a

ranging from security kernels to cryptographic systems.
Unfortunately, there are not many applications of these
theories <:o real systems. Those systems which are
implemented are implemented as one of two types. In a
single levtil system, every task has access to everything,
because all of the information is at or below the
classification to which the least cleared user has access.
In esistinq multilevel systems, information is allowed to
be migrated from lower levels of protection to higher
levels, but the reverse is not true.
There have been attempts to avoid the security problems
associated with command and control simulations by creating
a test scenario with "test only" unclassified information.
Unfortunately, there are several problems to this approach.
Often the connectivity of the various nodes within a
command and control network is classified. Hiding the
connectivity by using test only network configurations
could often invalidate the entire simulation. When actual
tactical interfaces are involved, the information conveyed
across the interface may be perishable and of low
classification. Yet, almost all of the formats used for
computer to computer interfaces, and many of the manual and
computer assisted interfaces, are classified independent of
classification of the content.
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1 Downg rading and 5ar.it iiatian
Accepting that a classified environment is
unavoidable, is it possible to use an existing single or
multilevel approach to solve the problem? Tha answer is no
in some cases. The task of some of the nodes in many
command and control networks is the declassification or
sanitization of highly protected information for use by
nodes with lower levels of access. A good example, without
elaboration, is a direct support intelligence facility.
This requires the capability in the simulation of the
network for a task to make portions of information
protected at some level available to tasks with an access
level that would nocmally preclude access to the
information. None of the current computer security systems
accounts for this type of function.
The only approach with any current acceptability,
that actually results in downgnd iug or sanitization, is
the use of a manned simulator for the downgrading or
sanitization task. In the distributed simulation, the
manned simulator would be treated as a noncompatible task
and would be connected to the interface process by two or
more distinct tasks, one at each level of protection.
Even this approach does not provide a solution
which is acceptable to all potential users. When the
actual command and control system is employed in a tactical
environment, there is a risk that a human operator or
3

automated process will improperly downgrade or sanitize
information and inadvertently compromise some portion of
the original information. A major design and training
concern in the real system is to maintain this risk at a
level that is acceptable with regard to the consequences of
not making the downgraded or sanitized information
available. Many policymakers feel that a higher risk is
acceptable in a tactical environment than is acceptable in
a testing environment. Thus, any risk of operator or
simulator error might be considered unacceptable. The only
apparent solution to this assessment is the simulation of
the system by two or more independent tasks. One type of
task acts as a sink, accepting and acknowledging
information at the higher level of protection. Another
type of task generates representative information at the
lower levels of protection, without any reference to the
information received at higher levels of protection. The
independence of the tasks means that there is no way to
analyze any question which requires the flow of information
through the simulated system, but a reasonable looking
level of background activity can be generated for the
loading of the network. This assists in the throughput
analysis of other information transfer processes.
2 . Classification bv Collation
There is another security issue which must be
addressed on a case by case basis. This issue is
8 1

classification fay collation. In these cases, a data base
may be generated at a given classification level by
collecting together a number of data items, all of which
are individually classified at lower levels. For example,
information regarding the lccation and characteristics of
an individual target, such as a railroad bridge, may be
unclassified. A target list containing information about
all potential targets in an area of operations is a
different matter. Each entry in the list could be
unclassified, but their collation as a single entity
provides information which enceads the collective content
of the individual entries. An examination of the list as a
whole provides a picture of the overall accuracy of the
targeting assessment for the area and, by exclusion from
the list, of any oversights in the process. Therefore, the
target list would be classified at a higher level. The
resolution of this problem is a classic case of tradeoff
analysis. If each entry in the list is protected at the
level afforded to the list as a whole, it will not be
available to the tasks which would normally have access to
it. In addition, the task which initially generates the
entry may not be authorized access to that level of
information. On the other hand, treating the individual
entries at their own classification introduces the risk of
compromising the entire target list by allowing it to be
collated one entry at a time at the artificially low level.
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As stated before, each occurrence of classification by
collation must be assessed individually.
3 . Judamen
t
It should be obvious that there is no simple or
clearly right answer to the security problems inherent in
command and control systems and thus also in their
simulation. Ultimately, the solution must rest with the
judgment of competent authority, based upon an assessment
of benefit versus acceptability of risk.
B TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
Throughout the discussion of the distributed simulation
there has been an underlying, but never stated, assumption
that all of the tasks are essentially concurrent. There
obviously must be some way to synchronize all of thes*
tasks A simulation task cannot begin to compute the
result of a time or event step until all inputs from
previous steps have been received from other tasks. Thare
are several conceptual levels of synchronization, from
multitasking to event step. Only two are particularly
unique to the distributed simulation approach.
1 . Master CI ock
Numerous techniques can be utilized to synchronize
the various tasks in a simulation. A large number use some
sort of a master clock. This clock can be kept in terms of
simulation time, event number, step number, or a number of
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different counters. The prime principle is that the cloc/c
is a globally available variable that synchronizes the task
esecutions. This is a simple concept in theory, but the
use of real computers in a distributed environment makes
this a very difficult concept to implement. The individual
tasks must be synchronized to the clock, a function which
is addressed in section 2 below. In addition, the clock
must be available to each task, which means it must be
logically available at each processor. If there are ten
processors, there are ten virtual views of the clock,
synchronizing these views of the clock with each other will
be addressed in section 3 below.
2 . S Y ^ ghronii ing to Clock
Consider Figure 22. Task 1 computes parameters to
be passed to task 2. Assume that both tasks are time step
simulations, with the time steps synchronized to coincide.
#
Task 1 and task 2 each signal task 3 when they have
completed processing for the current time step. Task 3
then updates the clock. Task 2 detects the clock update
either actively or passively and computes the neat
interval This is simple in theory, mostly because ail of
the discussion, and the underlying model, have been based
upon the assumption that the results of task 1 are
instantaneously transferred to task 2. Unfortunately, the
transfer takes a finite amount of time that is a complex
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FIGURE 22. Task Synchronization
the data rate on the channel, and other processor and
channel loading which must be multiplexed with thd transfer
function. The problem becomes even more complicated when
all of the interface combinations discussed in Section VII
are considered. Of utmost concern is the case where the
transfer of information is via a data base to data base
interface across three separate processors.
A lucky designer will be able to implement some
sort of positive task handshaking, but shouldn't count on
this solution in too many cases. Often, the clock is
specified in the initial functional requirements to be tied
to "wall clock" or real time. This is often necessary in
3

order to connect to manned simulators or tactical systems
themselves, or to accurately assess human performance under
loading and fatigue conditions. The result is an exception
to the general rule of location independence for tasks.
Careful consideration and analysis must be applied to
processor loading and to the required bandwidth between
tasks Tasks must then be allocated to processors in a
manner which will allow transfer delays to be limited to
times which are acceptably small compared to the step times
expected .
3 . Clock Synchronisation
As stated above, communications is not an
instantaneous process. Also, the delay between a given
pair of tasks will vary with both time and the tasks
comprising the pair. If two tasks in separate processors
both query a clock variable in a data base in a third
processor at the same time, they may receive different
values This is because one of the requests takes longer
than the other to reach the appropriate data base access
task In addition, the responses are subjected to
different delays and therefore, one of the times may be
more accurate than the other when received by the original
tasks. One example case will be used to show the
complexity of the problem. Detailing all of the
possibilities is not possible.
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The worst case arises when the interprocessor
delays are greater than the time step of the simulation.
For example, consider the case wher«s a tactical interface
is being monitored utilizing the T\DI L B interface
standard. The characteristics of this standard are such
that the monitoring of the data exchange must be time
tagged to the nearest .001 second. The J1NTACCS test bed,
which tests this standard, stretches from Bedford,
Massachusetts, to San Diego, California, using leased
commercial telephone lines The communications delays in
the circuits are much greater than the time step for the
system clock. The master clock in this example would be
some function of real time. The delay c<.n be eliminated as
a factor by keeping real time in each processor, along with
the parameters that define the current translation
function. However, this approach assumes that the real
times kept by the processors are synchronized to within
.001 second. Most computer system clocks are guaranteed to
remain within some deviation from the initially set time
for a specified duration of time. The problem thus reduces
to one of accurately setting each clock at specified
intervals .
WW radio receivers could be used to receive the
transmitted standard time signal. This approach suffers
from two problems. First, it is costly to install and
maintain receivers at a large number of sites which may
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participate only on an infrequent basis. Second;-/, the
receivers have oscillators and antennas. As such, unless
expensive precautions are taken, they become an
unacceptable security risk due to undesired electromagnetic
r ad i a t i on
.
One solution is to arbitrarily designate one of the
clocks as correct. The system is then configured so as to
stabilize the delays as much as possible. Test messages
are sent from the selected standard processor to each other
processor and returned until a confidence interval is
established for the round trip time. A message is then
sent setting the remote clock to the current time plus half
of the round trip delay. This message is also relayed b a c Jc
to. the original processor in order to ensure against an
abnormal delay during this message. This procedure works
well if two assumptions can be satisfied. First the
confidence interval must be such that the maximum possible
error in the one way delay time is less than the maximum
acceptable clock error. The second assumption is that the
time delay is the same in both directions. If not, a more
complex set of test messages is necessary to establish
delays in each direction. Once the local clock has been
set, local tasks use this clock for synchronization and the
delay from the master processor is no longer a factor until




In any introductory statistics course, someone will
always ask how big a sample must be in order to be big
enough. T!u same is true of the testing that is necessary
to validate a simulation once it has been designed and
implemented There is always considerable debate as to how
much testing is enough. And, like the sampling question,
there is no definitive an swe r . Th e testing of si mu 1 a t o r s
and simulations is a very subjective and political issue,
for a number of reasons.
Simulation validation is very expensive. The logical
structure of a s.mulation can often be more complex than
that of the system being simulated. This is due to the
requirement to simulate complex phenomenon, such as weapons
effects, which are taken as a given in the real systems.
In addition, t hd simulation is interested in not only
generating « h e same decisions as the simulated system, but
also in tracing the evolution of the decision.
The result of validation is not a piece of hardware, or
a program that can be utilized. Rather, it is some amount
of confidence or doubt about the ability of the simulation
to perform adequately. The cost factor and lack of
tangible results lead to the subjective nature of
validation. It is much like security in this manner.
Ultimately, a commander must make an individual choice as
to an acceptable and affordable level of validation.
8?

The main concern with the distributed simulation is
with the degree to which each task is validated A major
premise has been that tasks could be utilised off the snel
f
from other simulations. Using a task implies a certain
degree of confidence in it's functioning. This must Le
based upon experience with the task, knowledge of the
developing organization, or some validation process.
Section IX will address configuration management within a
network simulation co mmunity. It is essential that this
configuration management effort track the validation
associated with each task so that reasonable dasi^n
decisions can be made regarding the task
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I X . MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A sound management policy is essential to any complex
computer system. In this section, several of the major
considerations for the management of a simulation network
will be presented.
A. CONFIGURATION CONTROL
7ery few computer systems are static. The problems
which the systems are designed to address often change.
Perhaps more often, the user of the system may change his
perception of the problem. Documentation and configuration
.aan^gement are the tools by which dynamic growth of a
system are effected. Before a system is modified it is
essential that the current state of the system be known.
And as changes evolve, they must be tracked, so that
unintentional side effects can be isolated at a later time.
In Section I, it was mentioned that the IF FN program
was repeating development work done by the JINTACCS
program, and that the JI NT ACCS program had repeated
development work done by the TACS/TADS program. Why?
Among other reasons, both the JINTACCS program, and the
TACS/TADS program "saved" development funds by cutting back
on the documentation and configuration management aspects
of their respective test systems. One might assume that
9 1

the importance of configuration management was not
understood by the staffs of these programs. Yet both
programs had a primary mission of managing the
configuration management program for a Joint Chiefs of
Staff directed interface among tactical command and control
sy s t ems
.
The primary advantage to be gainad from a simulation
network is in the area of resource sharing. Before an off
the shelf task can be incorporated into a developing
simulation, the simulation designer must be able to
understand what the task does, and what the interface
specifications are. He must alio be convinced that the
task will remain available for use This places a
c on figuration management responsibility upon the
organization which developed the task initially. The
organization must provide complets documentation concerning
the function of the task, the assumptions which have been
applied, and the interface specifications. In addition,
the organization must baseline the task. A new "improved"
version cannot be substituted for the task unless it
continues to meet the needs of the other organizations
which are using the baseline version.
A simulation network needs an active configuration
management plan. Many approaches to configuration
management have been shown to be successful . Any which is
agreed upon by the network participants is acceptable,
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provided that it baselines each task, provides a method for
approving new versions, and tracks the users of each task
B. COMMUNITY ACCEPTABILITY
In order to be useful, a network would have to be
accepted by the community which it is supposed to be
serving. Past experience has shown that the Department of
Defense is too fragmented, with too many loopholes, to
force standardization compliance on any of the services, or
their major elements. A look at past attempts to
standardize programming languages, culminating in the
recent decision to make ADA optional until it is acceptable
to the user community, is a good example of how successful
the "special case" argument can be. Therefore, a network
will only be used seriously if it helps the using
organizations accomplish their mission. The rest of this
section is speculation, based upon experience, as to how
acceptability could be achieved in a simulation network
Initially, none of the major programs will share any of
the assets available on a network. They have funds to
develop unique systems, and a vested interest in producing
results that are not reproducible by other organizations,
particularly those which might be reviewing the results.
However, a few of the well established and less paranoid
organizations will make their tasks available on a network,
if one is established. Some of these tasks, most probably
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those developed by the software support facilities within
the services, will be documented in a usable manner.
Analytical organizations within the services have generally
been unable to afford large simulations, particularly of
tactical systems. As a result, one or two will invest in
access to the network. Using t h ft assets available on the
network, and providing some local tasks to customise the
simulations to their particular neisds, will provide an
affordable new and powerful tool for use by these
o r gani za t i ons .
These analytic organizations review and comment on the
reports published by the major progran.s. As their comments
become more detailed, and better supported, the tools which
they are using will by examined by the major program
managers. It is unfortunate, but true, that much more time
is spent throwing stones at sound analysis methodologies
than in discussion of the results of the analysis.
As a result of this examination of the capabilities of
the analytic organizations, the major programs will begin
to utilize the assets of the network in order to provide a
capability to rapidly repeat and alter the tests conducted
by the reviewing agencies There seems to be an
institutional rule at the joint service level that says
that if a simulation can be shown to fail under one set of
assumptions, it is invalid for any other set of
assumptions. A very common rebuttal technique when
9 4

reviewing the results of a simulation is to modify the
assumptions, and show that the result with the new
assumptions is absurd. Thus, the original analysis must
also be absurd. This may not be a very valid argument, but
experience has shown that it is very prevalent. Correct or
otherwise, it provides a powerful momentum for having
access to the same tools which are being used to generate
the original results. As a result, when the organizations
with tight budgets have accepted a network: as a valid tool,
the more affluent programs will accept the concept as a
means of self defense
C. TACIT STANDARDIZATION
As indicated above, efforts to enforce standardization
on operational military systems have not been particularly
successful. In this light, it would appear to be even less
likely to enforce a standardization of the tools used to
develop and analyze these systems. Yet, the entire concept
of the simulation network rests upon the standardization of
the interfaces among tasks. How can this parados be
resolved?
The previous section presented speculation as to how a
network might come to be accepted by a community of users.
If this premise is accepted, it follows that there will be
one or more sets of tasks which comprise a core simulation
with a family of tasks to customize this core to particular
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applications. Since these tasks would b & written to
conform to the existing interfaces in the set of core
tasks, these tasks comprise a tacit or de facto standard.
The interface is controlled by the configuration management
process and is "approved" by usage.
The piime difference between these standards and an
enforced standard is that enforced standards require the
foresight to develop the standard prior to development of
the tasks to 1) e supported. The de facto standard is an
evolutionary result of the usefulness of a particular set
of tasks. There are numerous examples of de facto
standards in bcth industry and the military.
Th« C P f M operating system for microcomputers is not a
particularly elegant, nor efficient, operating system.
Yet, it w & s useful and available and became widespread.
The large Amount of supporting software that was developed
using it established a de facto standard for co mm e r c i a 1
software written for 8080 family microcomputers.
The ARPANET provides an example within the military.
There are numerous editors available on the network.
Several of the more useful have been utilized as callable
tasks by other processes, such as message handlers, and as
front end processors for text formatting programs. These
program linkages and dependencies form a de facto
standardization on a distributed network. In this case,
the community which has embraced this standard has a number
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of diverging mission areas. But, the standard is useful,
and therefore it has survived.
D. SCHEDULING
One of the greatest problems in the simulation of
command and control networks is scheduling Several of the
organizations which have the major assets, particularly the
manned simulators, are working three shifts z day. The use
of a network probably will not alleviate the wo :• k load on
these simulators. The only savings to be gained would be
the freeing of the simulator when anothei form of
simulation, previously unavailable, could satisfy the
r e qu i r em en ts of a particular test. Howe vet, this wou Id be
offset by the requests from organizations which previously
did not have access to the simulator.
There is one case in which the network could provide
some relief on tight schedules. A given simulation task
can often be conducted at any of several sites. This
applies to both the manned simulators, which are often
situated at both development and training sites, and to
computer programs, which could run on any of a number of
similar configurations. Typically however, they are only
run in one location. This is because only one location has
the analysts and test control personnel to supervise the
test and dissect the results. Using a network, the logical
availability and connectivity of a task are not dependent
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upon its physical location. Thus, it becomes possible to
relocate a given task to a new site, with no analytical
capability loss. There is an impact on test control only
if a controller must be physically located with a test




This section will present a short summary of the
important requirements for a distributed network to support
command and control network simulations, and some personal
comments regarding the methodology.
A. REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS
Although the methodology presented in this thesis can
have very powerful results, it is reasonably simple in
concept. Therefore, thure are very few hard requirements
for implementation. The following items are the key
requirements presented in the previous sections.
1. The processing nodes in a command and control
network should be modelsd as separate systems without any
assumptions about the actual source of input information or
destination oi output information. This allows the level
of detail in the simulation, and the configuration of the
simulated network to be varied without impact on the
individual node simulations.
2. All simulation tasks should co mmunicate via an
interface process. This process resides at the utility
program or operating system level of the host architecture.




3. The interface process is segmented into pr;mary and
secondary tasks. The primary tasks are essential to the
function of the process, and are bound tc each other at the
time of creation. The secondary tasks tailor the interface
process to the individual requirements of a g • v e n
s imu 1 a t i on
.
4. Only the primary tasks must be replicated in s a c h
processing node in order to support a distributed
arch itecture.
5. Individual tasks send data to logical address
lists, not to specific tasks. The address list associated
with a task's channel of communication is established when
the channel is opened and remains constant
6. Entries in address lists may be dynamically changed
during the execution of a simulation. Address lists
contain the logical names of the task input channels
designated to receive data sent to the address List.
7. The primary tasks within the interface process are
responsible for translating logical channel names into
communication paths with physical tasks. The primary tasks
are the only tasks aware of the relationship between
address lists and logical names, and between logical names
and physical channels.
3. Several issues to be resolved by simulation
developers, such as security, will be major factors in the
usability of the network by a large community of users.
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9. Documentation and configuration management are
absolutely vital to the degree to which network resources
a :: e sharable.
10. Standardization should evolve as a function of
task usefulness, rather than being imposed as an entry
cond i t i on
.
B. COMMENTS
The methodology for the implementation of the interface
process which has been presented in this thesis has been
addressed from the point of view of supporting the
simulation of command and control networks. However, it is
raally a very general system concept. As such, it appears
to be useful in a large number of networking environments
where distributed tasks must act cooperatively. For
instance, consider a distributed information management
system. One of the major problems to be addressed has
always been how to cope with a dynamic network
configuration so that information reporting, collating, or
retrieval processes know where data bases are. Several
prototypes simply give each process a list of alternative
locations to be searched in order to locate the data base.
A much simpler approach might be to use logical names for
the data base access tasks and allow an interface process
to resolve the location problem. Updating a logical data
base with new or changed data is also simplified, since the
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dynamic nature of the address list allows multiple updates
from a process :s easily as a single update. And, the data
capture capabilities accommodate :he requirement to save
copies of transactions foe recovery and reconstitution
purposes .
Several peopie who have reviewed draft copies of
portions of this thesis have asked questions such as "How
would the tasks associated with the simulation of be
distributed across the network?" This thesis has attempted
to specifically avoid addressing that type o £ question.
This policy is not because c£ the difficulty of answering
the question, although it is a difficult question. Rather
it is a matter of the proper perspective on the purpose of
the thesis. The purpose of the thesis was to present a
simulation environment that would support a distributed
implementation with the sharing of resources. Hopefully,
it does so. However, while it is important that the
specification address all aspects of importance, it is also
essential that it not be over specified. This environment
is designed to help the simulation designer by extending
the options available to him. An attempt to answer issues
such as that above would only serve to place artificial
limits on application techniques utilized.
For the same reason, I have failed to address the
issues of how the primary tasks should communicate with the
secondary tasks, and how the i n t e r p r o c e s s o r communications
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should be managed. Neither issue impacts on the basic
concept. Any method which makes sense for the particular
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